9.2: Norms

The norm of a vector in an arbitrary inner product space is the analog of the length or magnitude of a vector in (mathbb{R}^{n}). We formally define this concept as follows.

Definition 9.2.1. Let (V ) be a vector space over (mathbb{F}). A map
orm{cdot} : V & o mathbb{R}
v &mapsto orm{v}
is a norm on (V ) if the following three conditions are satisfied.

  1. Positive definiteness: ( orm{v}=0 ) if and only if (v=0);
  2. Positive Homogeneity: ( orm{av}=|a|, orm{v} ) for all (ain mathbb{F} ) and (vin V);
  3. Triangle inequality: ( orm{v+w}le orm{v}+ orm{w} ) for all (v,win V).

Remark 9.2.2. Note that, in fact, ( orm{v}ge 0 ) for each (vin V ) since

[ 0 = orm{v-v} le orm{v} + orm{-v} = 2 orm{v}. ]

Next we want to show that a norm can always be defined from an inner product (inner{cdot}{cdot} ) via the formula

[ orm{v} = sqrt{inner{v}{v}} ~ ext{for all} ~ v in V . ag{9.2.1} ]

Properties 1 and 2 follow easily from Conditions~1 and 3 of Definition~9.1.1. The triangle inequality requires more careful proof, though, which we give in Theorem~9.3.4 ef{thm:triangle} in the next chapter.

If we take (V=mathbb{R}^n), then the norm defined by the usual dot product is related to the usual notion of length of a vector. Namely, for (v=(x_1,ldots,x_n)in mathbb{R}^n), we have
egin{equation} label{eqn:NormInRn}
orm{v} = sqrt{x_1^2+cdots + x_n^2}. ag{9.2.2}

We illustrate this for the case of (mathbb{R^3} ) in Figure 9.2.1.

Figure 9.2.1: The length of a vector in ( mathbb{R^3} ) via equation 9.2.1.

While it is always possible to start with an inner product and use it to define a norm, the converse requires more care. In particular, one can prove that a norm can be used to define an inner product via Equation 9.2.1 if and only if the norm satisfies the Parallelogram Law (Theorem 9.3.6~ ef{thm:ParallelogramLaw}).

9.2 Norms and Customs

Indeed, the cases I’ve described weren’t, in the end, only about law. They also had everything to do with the norms, or customs, we should consider as we work, play and collaborate in a digital mediasphere.

In previous chapters we’ve considered how we should react to things we find online, especially derogatory and even hateful speech, and how we should behave ourselves in our speech. I want to give these issues extra emphasis here.

It should go without saying that people shouldn’t use our new media tools for cruel purposes. Given that some will, what kinds of norms can we encourage so that the targets of cruelty can either respond or, better yet, learn to ignore the attacks?

Telling our children to grow thicker skins is, of course, not going to get us very far, and we don’t want to create a generation of purely cynical adults. But social-media training needs to include the digital-age versions of cautions we’ve long suggested to children, such as the admonition not to get into a car with an adult who’s a stranger. Again, trust depends in large part on what we can verify, or what we’ve learned, though our own experience and the advice of others, to trust.

Detailed Information

In 2010, IFOAM launched its new Organic Guarantee System (OGS). The implementation of this new OGS brought major changes to the IFOAM Norms.

Since 2012, the IFOAM norms contain the following normative documents:

  • The IFOAM Standard: an off-the-shelf certification standard.
  • The IFOAM Standards Requirements, also called the Common Objectives and Requirements of Organic Standards (COROS), which replaced the IFOAM Basic Standards (IBS)
  • The IFOAM Accreditation Requirements(formerly IFOAM Accreditation Criteria).

The development of the IFOAM Norms is regulated by the IFOAM Policy 20 and involves three committees (for more information, please visit the OGS Commitees page) and goes through a number of public consultation rounds and membership motion processes.

Earlier Versions of the IFOAM Norms

Latest change:

In October 2018, the 2014 Version was re-published with new edits approved by our World Board. Edits consisted of the addition of the preamble to the IFOAM Accreditation Requirements (page 91).

In June 2017, the 2014 Version was re-published as an edited version in 2017. Edits concerned only the name of IFOAM (changed to IFOAM - Organics International) and the removal of the concept of "IFOAM Global Organic System Accreditation" (now simply called "IFOAM Accreditation"). Additionally, the footnote to requirement 9.2.2. in the IFOAM Accreditation Requirements was edited to refer to the IFOAM program of recognition of conformity assessment systems, set-up in 2015.

Earlier changes:

On July 25, 2014 the new version of the IFOAM Norms, Version 2014, replaced the former Version 2012, which had itself replaced the Version 2005.

What has changed in the IFOAM norms between Version 2005 and the subsequent versions?

9.2 Work Group Structure

Work group structure can be characterized in many different ways. We examine several characteristics that are useful in describing and understanding what makes one group different from another. This matrix of variables will, when taken together, paint a portrait of work groups in terms of relatively enduring group properties. The aspects of group structure to be considered are (1) work roles, (2) work group size, (3) work group norms, (4) status relationships, and (5) work group cohesiveness. Each of these factors has been shown to influence group processes, as shown in Exhibit 9.3. Thus, the material presented here will be important when we focus on group processes later in the text.

Work Roles

In order to accomplish its goals and maintain its norms, a group must differentiate the work activities of its members. One or more members assume leadership positions, others carry out the major work of the group, and still others serve in support roles. This specialization of activities is commonly referred to as role differentiation. More specifically, a work role is an expected behavior pattern assigned or attributed to a particular position in the organization. It defines individual responsibilities on behalf of the group.

It has been suggested that within organizational settings, work roles can be divided into three types on the basis of the nature of the activities that encompass the role. 6 These are:

  1. Task-oriented roles. These roles focus on task-related activities aimed at achieving group performance goals.
  2. Relations-oriented roles. These roles emphasize the further development of the group, including building group cohesiveness and consensus, preserving group harmony, looking after group member welfare, and so forth.
  3. Self-oriented roles. These roles emphasize the specific needs and goals of individual members, often at the expense of the group.

As we might expect, individual group members often perform several of these roles simultaneously. A group leader, for example, must focus group attention on task performance while at the same time preserving group harmony and cohesiveness. To see how this works, consider your own experience. You may be able to recognize the roles you have played in groups you have been a member of. In your experience, have you played multiple roles or single roles?

Perhaps the best way to understand the nature of work roles is to examine a role episode . A role episode is an attempt to explain how a particular role is learned and acted upon. As can be seen in Exhibit 9.4, a role episode begins with members’ expectations about what one person should be doing in a particular position (Stage 1). These expectations are then communicated to the individual (Stage 2), causing the individual to perceive the expectations about the expected role (Stage 3). Finally, the individual decides to act upon the role in terms of actual role-related behavior (Stage 4). In other words, Stages 1 and 2 deal with the expected role, whereas Stage 3 focuses on the perceived role and Stage 4 focuses on the enacted role.

Consider the following simple example. A group may determine that its newest member is responsible for getting coffee for group members during breaks (Stage 1). This role is then explained to the incoming member (Stage 2), who becomes aware of his or her expected role (Stage 3). On the basis of these perceptions (and probably reinforced by group norms), the individual then would probably carry out the assigned behavior (Stage 4).

Several aspects of this model of a role episode should be noted. First, Stages 1 and 2 are initiated by the group and directed at the individual. Stages 3 and 4, on the other hand, represent thoughts and actions of the individual receiving the stimuli. In addition, Stages 1 and 3 represent cognitive and perceptual evaluations, whereas Stages 2 and 4 represent actual behaviors. The sum total of all the roles assigned to one individual is called the role set .

Although the role episode presented here seems straightforward, in reality we know that it is far more complicated. For instance, individuals typically receive multiple and sometimes conflicting messages from various groups, all attempting to assign them a particular role. This can easily lead to role conflict . Messages sent to an individual may sometimes be unclear, leading to role ambiguity . Finally, individuals may simply receive too many role-related messages, contributing to role overload . Discussion of these topics is reserved for later study, where examination of several important aspects of psychological adjustment to work.

Work Group Size

Obviously, work groups can be found in various sizes. Early management theorists spent considerable time and effort to no avail attempting to identify the right size for the various types of work groups. There is simply no right number of people for most group activities. They did, however, discover a great deal about what happens as group size increases. 7 A number of relevant size-outcome relationships are summarized in Table 9.2.

Effects of Group Size on Group Dynamics
Factor Size of Group
Small Large
Group interaction Increased Decreased
Group cohesiveness Higher Lower
Job satisfaction Higher Lower
Absenteeism Lower Higher
Turnover Lower Higher
Social loafing Lower Higher
Productivity No clear relation No clear relation

Group Interaction Patterns. First, we will consider the effects of variations in group size on group interaction patterns. A series of classic studies by Bales and Borgatta examined this issue using a technique known as interaction process analysis . 8 This technique records who says what to whom through using it, Bales and his colleagues found that smaller groups (2–4 persons) typically exhibited greater tension, agreement, and opinion seeking, whereas larger groups (13–16 persons) showed more tension release and giving of suggestions and information. This suggests that harmony is crucial in smaller groups and that people in them have more time to develop their thoughts and opinions. On the other hand, individuals in larger groups must be more direct because of the increased competition for attention.

Job Attitudes. Increases in work group size are fairly consistently found to be inversely related to satisfaction, although the relationship is not overly strong. 9 That is, people working in smaller work units or departments report higher levels of satisfaction than those in larger units. This finding is not surprising in view of the greater attention one receives in smaller groups and the greater importance group members typically experience in such things as their role set.

Absenteeism and Turnover. Available research indicates that increases in work group size and absenteeism are moderately related among blue-collar workers, although no such relationship exists for white-collar workers. 10 One explanation for these findings is that increased work group size leads to lower group cohesiveness, higher task specialization, and poorer communication. As a result, it becomes more difficult to satisfy higher-order needs on the job, and job attendance becomes less appealing. This explanation may be more relevant in the case of blue-collar workers, who typically have little job autonomy and control. White-collar workers typically have more avenues available to them for need satisfaction. Similar findings exist for employee turnover. Turnover rates are higher in larger groups. 11 It again can be hypothesized that because larger groups make need satisfaction more difficult, there is less reason for individuals to remain with the organization.

Productivity. No clear relationship has been found between group size and productivity. 12 There is probably a good reason for this. Unless we take into consideration the type of task that is being performed, we really cannot expect a clear or direct relationship. Mitchell explains it as follows:

Think of a task where each new member adds a new independent amount of productivity (certain piece-rate jobs might fit here). If we add more people, we will add more productivity. . . . On the other hand, there are tasks where everyone works together and pools their resources. With each new person the added increment of new skills or knowledge decreases. After a while increases in size will fail to add much to the group except coordination and motivation problems. Large groups will perform less well than small groups. The relationship between group size and productivity will therefore depend on the type of task that needs to be done. 13

However, when we look at productivity and group size, it is important to recognize the existence of a unique factor called social loafing , 14 a tendency for individual group members to reduce their effort on a group task. This phenomenon occurs when (1) people see their task as being unimportant or simple, (2) group members think their individual output is not identifiable, and (3) group members expect their fellow workers to loaf. Social loafing is more prevalent in larger groups than in smaller groups, presumably because the above three factors are accentuated. From a managerial standpoint, this problem can be reduced by providing workers with greater responsibility for task accomplishment and more challenging assignments. This issue is addressed in the following chapter on job design.

Work Group Norms

The concept of work group norms represents a complex topic with a history of social psychological research dating back several decades. In this section, we will highlight several of the essential aspects of norms and how they relate to people at work. We will consider the characteristics and functions of work group norms as well as conformity with and deviance from them.

Characteristics of Work Group Norms. A work group norm may be defined as a standard that is shared by group members and regulates member behavior within an organization. An example can be seen in a typical classroom situation when students develop a norm against speaking up in class too often. It is believed that students who are highly visible improve their grades at the expense of others. Hence, a norm is created that attempts to govern acceptable classroom behavior. We see similar examples in the workplace. There may be a norm against producing too much or too little, against getting too close to the supervisor, against being late for work, and so forth.

Work group norms may be characterized by at least five factors: 15

  1. Norms summarize and simplify group influence processes. They denote the processes by which groups regulate and regularize member behavior.
  2. Norms apply only to behavior, not to private thoughts and feelings. Although norms may be based on thoughts and feelings, they cannot govern them. That is, private acceptance of group norms is unnecessary—only public compliance is needed.
  3. Norms are generally developed only for behaviors that are viewed as important by most group members.
  4. Norms usually develop gradually, but the process can be quickened if members wish. Norms usually are developed by group members as the need arises, such as when a situation occurs that requires new ground rules for members in order to protect group integrity.
  5. All norms do not apply to all members. Some norms, for example, apply only to young initiates (such as getting the coffee), whereas others are based on seniority, sex, race, or economic class.

Functions of Work Group Norms. Most all groups have norms, although some may be more extensive than others. To see this, examine the norms that exist in the various groups to which you belong. Which groups have more fully developed norms? Why? What functions do these norms serve? Several efforts have been made to answer this question. In general, work group norms serve four functions in organizational settings: 16

  1. Norms facilitate group survival. When a group is under threat, norms provide a basis for ensuring goal-directed behavior and rejecting deviant behavior that is not purposeful to the group. This is essentially a “circle the wagons” phenomenon.
  2. Norms simplify expected behaviors. Norms tell group members what is expected of them—what is acceptable and unacceptable—and allow members to anticipate the behaviors of their fellow group members and to anticipate the positive or negative consequences of their own behavior.
  3. Norms help avoid embarrassing situations. By identifying acceptable and unacceptable behaviors, norms tell group members when a behavior or topic is damaging to another member. For example, a norm against swearing signals group members that such action would be hurtful to someone in the group and should be avoided.
  4. Norms help identify the group and express its central values to others. Norms concerning clothes, language, mannerisms, and so forth help tell others who belongs to the group and, in some cases, what the group stands for. Norms often serve as rallying points for group members.

Conformity and Deviance. Managers often wonder why employees comply with the norms and dictates of their work group even when they seemingly work against their best interests. This concern is particularly strong when workers intentionally withhold productivity that could lead to higher incomes. The answer to this question lies in the concept of conformity to group norms. Situations arise when the individual is swept along by the group and acts in ways that he would prefer not to.

To see how this works, consider the results of a classic study of individual conformity to group pressures that was carried out by Solomon Asch. 17 Asch conducted a laboratory experiment in which a native subject was placed in a room with several confederates. Each person in the room was asked to match the length of a given line (X) with that of one of three unequal lines (A, B, and C). This is shown in Exhibit 9.5. Confederates, who spoke first, were all instructed prior to the experiment to identify line C as the line most like X, even though A was clearly the answer. The results were startling. In over one-third of the trials in the experiment, the naive subject denied the evidence of his own senses and agreed with the answers given by the unknown confederates. In other words, when confronted by a unanimous answer from others in the group, a large percentage of individuals chose to go along with the group rather than express a conflicting opinion, even though these individuals were confident their own answers were correct.

What causes such conformity to group norms? And, under what conditions will an individual deviate from these norms? Conformity to group norms is believed to be caused by at least three factors. 18 First, personality plays a major role. For instance, negative correlations have been found between conformity and intelligence, tolerance, and ego strength, whereas authoritarianism was found to be positively related. Essentially, people who have a strong self-identity are more likely to stick to their own norms and deviate from those of the group when a conflict between the two exists. Second, the initial stimulus that evokes responses can influence conformity. The more ambiguous the stimulus (e.g., a new and confusing order from top management), the greater the propensity to conform to group norms (“I’m not sure what the new order from management really means, so I’ll just go along with what others think it means”). In this sense, conformity provides a sense of protection and security in a new and perhaps threatening situation. Finally, group characteristics themselves can influence conformity to group norms. Factors such as the extent of pressure exerted on group members to conform, the extent to which a member identifies with the group, and the extent to which the group has been successful in achieving previous goals can influence conformity.

What happens when someone deviates from group norms? Research indicates that groups often respond by increasing the amount of communication directed toward the deviant member. 19 This communication is aimed at bringing the deviant into the acceptable bounds set by the group. A good example of this process can be seen in Janis’s classic study of the group processes leading up to the abortive Bay of Pigs invasion in Cuba. 20 At one meeting, Arthur Schlesinger, an adviser to President Kennedy, expressed opposition to the plan even though no one else expressed similar doubts. After listening to his opposition for a while, Robert Kennedy took Schlesinger aside and said, “You may be right or you may be wrong, but the President has his mind made up. Don’t push it any further. Now is the time for everyone to help him all they can.” Janis elaborated on this group decision-making process and termed it “groupthink.”

When a deviant member refuses to heed the message and persists in breaking group norms, group members often respond by rejecting or isolating the deviant. They tell the deviant, in essence, that they will no longer tolerate such behavior and prefer to reconstitute the group. If the deviant is not expelled, the group must continually confront behavior that conflicts with what it holds to be true. Rather than question or reexamine its beliefs, the group finds it simpler—and safer—to rid itself of dangerous influences.

Status Systems

A fourth characteristic, or structural property, of work groups is the status system. Status systems serve to differentiate individuals on the basis of some criterion or set of criteria. There are five general bases on which status differentiations are made: birth, personal characteristics, achievement, possessions, and formal authority. All five bases can be seen as establishing status in work groups. For example, an employee may achieve high status because he is the boss’s son (birth), the brightest or strongest member of the group (personal characteristics), the best performer (achievement), the richest or highest paid (possessions), or the foreman or supervisor (formal authority).

Reasons for Status Systems. Status systems can be seen throughout most organizations. We differentiate between blue-collar and white-collar employees (and even pink and gold collar), skilled tradespersons and unskilled workers, senior and junior managers, high achievers and low achievers, and popular and unpopular employees. Why do we do this? In essence, status differentiation in organizations (and their related status symbols) serves four purposes: 21

Motivation. We ascribe status to persons as rewards or incentives for performance and achievement. If high achievement is recognized as positive behavior by an organization, individuals are more willing to exert effort.

Identification. Status and status symbols provide useful cues to acceptable behavior in new situations. In the military, for example, badges of rank quickly tell members who has authority and who is to be obeyed. Similarly, in business, titles serve the same purpose.

Dignification. People are often ascribed status as a means of signifying respect that is due them. A clergyman’s attire, for instance, identifies a representative of the church.

Stabilization. Finally, status systems and symbols facilitate stabilization in an otherwise turbulent environment by providing a force for continuity. Authority patterns, role relationships, and interpersonal interactions are all affected and, indeed, defined by the status system in effect. As a result, much ambiguity in the work situation is reduced.

Status can be conferred on an individual in many different ways. One way common in organizations is through the assignment and decoration of offices. John Dean, counsel to former President Nixon, provides the following account concerning status in the White House:

Everyone [on the White House Staff] jockeyed for a position close to the President’s ear, and even an unseasoned observer could sense minute changes in status. Success and failure could be seen in the size, decor, and location of offices. Anyone who moved into a smaller office was on the way down. If a carpenter, cabinetmaker, or wallpaper hanger was busy in someone’s office, this was the sure sign he was on the rise. Every day, workmen crawled over the White House complex like ants. Movers busied themselves with the continuous shuffling of furniture from one office to another as people moved in, up, down, or out. We learned to read office changes as an index of the internal bureaucratic power struggles. The expense was irrelevant to Haldeman. . . . He once retorted when we discussed whether we should reveal such expense, “This place is a national monument, and I can’t help it if the last three Presidents let it go to hell.” Actually, the costs had less to do with the fitness of the White House than with the need of its occupants to see tangible evidence of their prestige. 22

Modern businesses looking to attract top talent do not have office spaces that have a group of workers siloed in their own walled-off offices with doors 20 years old. 23

One Orlando business, for instance, spent about $330,000 on the design and build-out of its space.

Status Incongruence. An interesting aspect of status systems in organizations is the notion of status incongruence . This situation exists when a person is high on certain valued dimensions but low on others, or when a person’s characteristics seem inappropriate for a particular job. Examples of status incongruence include the college student who takes a janitorial job during the summer (usually referred to as the “college kid” by the other janitors), the president’s son who works his way up through the organizational hierarchy (at an accelerated rate, needless to say), or the young fast-track manager who is promoted to a level typically held by older employees.

Status incongruence presents problems for everyone involved. The individual may become the target of hostility and jealousy from coworkers who feel the individual has risen above his station. The coworkers, on the other hand, may be forced to acknowledge their own lack of success or achievement. One might ask, for example, “Why has this youngster been promoted over me when I have more seniority?” At least two remedies for this conflict are available to managers. An organization can (1) select or promote only those individuals whose characteristics are congruent with the job and work group, and (2) attempt to change the values of the group. Neither of these possibilities seems realistic or fair. Hence, dynamic organizations that truly reward high achievement (instead of seniority) must accept some level of conflict resulting from status incongruence.

Expanding Around the Globe

Status Systems in Japanese Business

In Japan, etiquette is not simply a prescription for appropriate social responses, it is a complete guide to conducting oneself in all social interactions. At the root of this system of social interaction is one’s status within the organization and society.

The effects of status in Japan can be seen in many ways. For example, when two businesspeople meet for the first time, they exchange business cards—before they even say hello to each other. After carefully reading the cards, each knows precisely the other’s rank (and status) in the organizational hierarchy and, thus, how to respond. The person with the lower status must bow lower than the person with the higher status.

Moreover, when four managers get into a car, status determines where each will sit. This is shown in Exhibit 9.6, where it can be seen that the most important (highest-status) manager will sit in the back seat, directly behind the driver. Similarly, when four managers enter an elevator, the least senior stands in front of the elevator controls, with the most senior behind. In a meeting room or in a restaurant, the most honored seat is farthest from the door, whereas the least honored is nearest the door. Even within the meeting room itself, a sofa is considered higher in rank than armchairs.

Clearly, status plays an important role in Japanese (and several other East Asian) societies. Status recognizes age (an important cultural variable in these societies) and tells everyone involved how to behave. Though such prescriptive practices may seem strange to many Westerners, it is quite natural in Japan. In fact, many Japanese feel such guidelines are helpful and convenient in defining social relationships, avoiding awkward situations, and making business transactions more comfortable and productive. Whether or not this perception is accurate, status systems are a fact of life that must be recognized by Western managers attempting to do business in Asia. Failure to understand such social patterns puts the Western manager at a distinct disadvantage.

Sources: Allison, “Useful Japanese Business Manners to Impress a Client or Guest,” Fast Japan, October 21, 2016 M. Yazinuma and R. Kennedy, “Life Is So Simple When You Know Your Place,” Intersect, May 1986, pp. 35–39.

Group Cohesiveness

A fifth characteristic of work groups is group cohesiveness. We have all come in contact with groups whose members feel a high degree of camaraderie, group spirit, and unity. In these groups, individuals seem to be concerned about the welfare of other group members as well as that of the group as a whole. There is a feeling of “us against them” that creates a closeness among them. This phenomenon is called group cohesiveness. More specifically, group cohesiveness may be defined as the extent to which individual members of a group are motivated to remain in the group. According to Shaw, “Members of highly cohesive groups are more energetic in group activities, they are less likely to be absent from group meetings, they are happy when the group succeeds and sad when it fails, etc., whereas members of less cohesive groups are less concerned about the group’s activities.” 24

We shall consider two primary aspects of work group cohesiveness. First, we look at major causes of cohesiveness. Following this, we examine its consequences.

Determinants of Group Cohesiveness. Why do some work groups develop a high degree of group cohesiveness while others do not? To answer this question, we have to examine both the composition of the group and several situational variables that play a role in determining the extent of cohesiveness. The major factors that influence group cohesiveness are shown in Exhibit 9.7. 25 These include the following:

  • Group homogeneity. The more homogeneous the group—that is, the more members share similar characteristics and backgrounds—the greater the cohesiveness.
  • Group maturity. Groups tend to become more cohesive simply as a result of the passage of time. Continued interaction over long periods of time helps members develop a closeness born of shared experiences.
  • Group size. Smaller groups have an easier time developing cohesiveness, possibly because of the less complex interpersonal interaction patterns.
  • Frequency of interaction. Groups that have greater opportunities to interact on a regular or frequent basis tend to become more cohesive than groups that meet less frequently or whose members are more isolated.
  • Clear group goals. Groups that know exactly what they are trying to accomplish develop greater cohesiveness, in part because of a shared sense of mission and the absence of conflict over mission.
  • Competition or external threat. When groups sense external threat or hostility, they tend to band together more closely. There is, indeed, “safety in numbers.”
  • Success. Group success on a previous task often facilitates increased cohesiveness and a sense of “we did it together.”

In other words, a wide variety of factors can influence work group cohesiveness. The precise manner in which these processes occur is not known. Even so, managers must recognize the existence of certain forces of group cohesiveness if they are to understand the nature of group dynamics in organizations. The second aspect of group cohesiveness that must be understood by managers relates to their consequences.

Consequences of Group Cohesiveness. As shown in Exhibit 9.7, several consequences of group cohesiveness can also be identified. The first and most obvious consequence is maintenance of membership. If the attractiveness of the group is sufficiently stronger than the attractiveness of alternative groups, then we would expect the individual to remain in the group. Hence, turnover rates should be low.

In addition, high group cohesiveness typically provides the group with considerable power over group members. The power of a group over members depends upon the level of outcomes members expect to receive from the group compared to what they could receive through alternate means. When the group is seen as being highly instrumental to achieving personal goals, individuals will typically submit to the will of the group.

Third, members of highly cohesive groups tend to exhibit greater participation and loyalty. Several studies have shown that as cohesiveness increases, there is more frequent communication among members, a greater degree of participation in group activities, and less absenteeism. Moreover, members of highly cohesive groups tend to be more cooperative and friendly and generally behave in ways designed to promote integration among members.

Fourth, members of highly cohesive groups generally report high levels of satisfaction. In fact, the concept of group cohesiveness almost demands all this be the case, because it is unlikely that members will feel like remaining with a group with which they are dissatisfied.

Finally, what is the effect of group cohesiveness on productivity? No clear relationship exists here. Instead, research shows that the extent to which cohesiveness and productivity are related is moderated by the extent to which group members accept organizational goals. This is shown in Exhibit 9.8. Specifically, when cohesiveness and acceptance of organizational goals are high, performance will probably be high. When acceptance is high but cohesiveness is low, group performance will typically be moderate. Finally, performance will generally be low when goal acceptance is low regardless of the extent of group cohesiveness. In other words, high performance is most likely to result when highly cohesive teams accept the goals of the organization. At this time, both forces for performance are congruent.

Managing Change

Group Cohesiveness

In the fast-moving innovative car industry, it is always important to be thinking about improving and staying ahead of the competition. For Ford and Chevrolet however, they have such popular vehicles—the F-150 and the hybrid Volt, respectively—that finding ways to improve them without taking away the qualities that make them popular is key.

With the F-150, Ford had one of the best-selling vehicles for more than 30 years, but improving upon their most popular vehicle came with its challenges. In 2015, the team wanted to introduce an economically six-cylinder EcoBoost engine, and an all-aluminum body. The team was worried about the marketplace and hoped that the customers would accept the change to their beloved truck.

The planning started 18 months before, working in parallel work teams on various parts of the project. Each team was responsible for a piece of the overall project, and they frequently came together to make sure that they were working cohesively to create a viable vehicle. The most successful piece of the dynamic for Ford was teams’ ability to share feedback. Pete Reyes expresses the teamwork mentality: “Everybody crosses boundaries, and they came back with all of the feedback that shaped what we are going to do.”

Having team cohesiveness was ultimately what brought Ford to the finish line. With over 1,000 members of the overall team, employees were able to accomplish a truly viable vehicle that weighed 700 pounds less, as well as countless other innovations that gave the truck 29 percent more fuel economy.

“We stuck to common goals . . . I don’t think I’ll ever work on a team that tight again,” stated Reyes about his team of developmental managers. As a result of their close teamwork, Ford announced third-quarter earnings of 1.9 billion, an increase of 1.1 billion from 2014.

Recommended Practices (RP) and Associated Technical Notes (TN).

The RECOMMENDED PRACTICE category was established by the NMRA Board of Trustees in January 1957, to:

  • Specify the details of major components to improve design and function.
  • Promote maximum interchange between and within units.

RECOMMENDED PRACTICES are only less mandatory than STANDARDS by virtue of their slightly less critical subject matter and/or the fact that deviation for specific reasons is permissible.

    - (07/07/2019) [includes data from former RP-8]
    • Note: For Help with NMRA Gauge letter definitions and the AAR Plate diagrams on which it's based see RP-2.
    • Note: The NMRA does not sell a Standards gauge for S scale, (standard gauge). Modellers looking for an S scale gauge should contact the National Association of S Gaugers at: The NMRA does have the Sn3 gauge available in the NMRA Store.
    • ​​RP-7.1 Tangent Track Centers and Clearance Diagrams (1/2019)
    • RP-7.2 Curved Track Centers (7/2017)
    • RP-7.3 Curved Track Obstacle Clearances (7/2017)
    • RP-7.4 Interurban Track Centers and Obstacle Clearances (7/2017)
    • RP-7.5 Modifying Tangent Clearance Diagrams for Curved Tracks (7/2017)
    • RP-7.6 Using the NMRA Curved Track Center and Obstacle Clearance Assistant (7/2017)
    • ​ Curved Track Center and Obstacle Clearance Assistant (tool link)
    • ​TN-11 Curvature and Rolling Stock - (4/2017)
      (2/2015) Engineering Analysis and Geometric Design of Model Railroad Turnouts Generalized Turnout Design, Generates Model Turnout Dimensions
      - (8/1981) - (8/1981) - (8/1981) - (8/1981)
      - (1/1990)
      - (1/1990)
      - (8/1957) - (2/1960)
      - (7/1982) - (8/1963) - (7/1982)
      - (3/1997)

    Push-Up Norms

    The expected number of push-ups you can do varies with your age and sex. The older you are, the less muscle mass you will have, and joints will be stiffer. Bodyweight and height will also affect how many push-ups you can do.

    If you have just started on a conditioning program, you will not be expected to be able to do many push-ups, maybe none. Don't get too disappointed, you will quickly improve with practice and training. See our Push-Up Workout.

    Push-up test norms for MEN

    Your Age 17-19 20-29 30-39 40-49 50-59 60-65
    Excellent 57+ 48+ 42+ 35+ 321+ 31+
    Good 47-56 39-47 34-41 28-34 25-31 24-30
    Above average 35-46 30-39 25-33 21-28 18-24 17-23
    Average 19-34 17-29 13-24 11-20 9-17 6-16
    Below average 11-18 10-16 8-12 6-10 5-8 3-5
    Poor 4-10 4-9 2-7 1-5 1-4 1-2
    Very Poor 0-3 0-3 0-1 0 0 0

    Push-up test norms for WOMEN

    Your Age 17-19 20-29 30-39 40-49 50-59 60-65
    Excellent 36+ 37+ 38+ 32+ 26+ 24+
    Good 27-35 30-36 30-37 25-31 21-25 19-23
    Above Average 21-27 23-29 22-30 18-24 15-20 13-18
    Average 11-20 12-22 10-21 8-17 7-14 5-12
    Below average 6-10 7-11 5-9 4-7 3-6 2-4
    Poor 2-5 2-6 1-4 1-3 1-2 1
    Very Poor 0-1 0-1 0 0 0 0

    * Source: adapted from Golding, et al. (1986). The Y's way to physical fitness (3rd ed.)

    2. A strong tradition of judicial self-restraint—and the challenge from Europe

    According to some political scientists and lawyers, having courts that can strike down law through a judicial review mechanism is not a human rights guarantee and not what defines a society based on the rule of law. 6 According to these theorists, a democracy is thus not defined by a division of powers between different branches of government, where the primary role of the courts is to protect fundamental rights. Quite the contrary. Democracy may function perfectly where it is the politicians, rather than the courts and judges, who protect citizens against the potential abuse of power by the state. What these theorists promote, however, is not democracy without limits. As Robert Dahl, who has been a strong influence on Scandinavian political thinking, puts it: “The democratic process could not exist unless it was self-limiting … unless it limited itself to decisions that did not destroy the conditions necessary to its own existence.” However, as Dahl continues: “… critics of the democratic process … propose limits that go far beyond the self-limits necessary to the process itself.” 7 Judicial review represents, according to Dahl, such a limit going “far beyond” what is strictly necessary in a democracy. According to him, judges are merely “… nonelected quasi guardians”—a criticism that is quite recognizable among participants in the Nordic debate on courts and democracy. 8 Richard Bellamy, too, has recently joined this choir: “The legal constitutionalist's attempt to constrain democracy undercuts the political constitutionalism of democracy itself, jeopardising the legitimacy and efficacy of law and the courts along the way.” 9 In the majority of Nordic countries, this basic but often implicit understanding is to be found as well—that courts should not impose limits on the democratic process, here understood as the parliamentary process, where elected (and thereby legitimized) politicians make choices everyday through their popular mandate. It has been part of a common Nordic 10 heritage for at least two centuries and, more specifically, since these modern democracies acquired their formal constitutions. In the Danish concept of democracy, parliament has thus always come first, 11 in the sense of being elevated above the other branches of government. In other words, majority rule has been the closest you could get to an ideal type of democracy. 12

    2.1. Judicial self-restraint

    If we look at the Danish courts’ reliance on the primacy of Parliament as a constitutional principle, this necessarily leads to a doctrine of self-restraint regarding judicial review of the constitutionality of acts of Parliament, insofar as the power of such judicial review is recognized at all.

    The doctrine of judicial self-restraint originates in American constitutional law. It seems to have found its first formulation in a famous article by James Thayer from 1893, in which he affirms the long-established power of U.S. courts to undertake constitutional review 13 while emphasizing, however, that in performing such a review the courts should respect that the legislator has “a wide margin of consideration.” 14 Decades later, in 1936, Thayer's call for a doctrine of judicial self-restraint found its way to the U.S. Supreme Court, when in a legal opinion Justice Stone lent the doctrine his support, famously adding that “the only check upon our own exercise of power is our own sense of self-restraint.” 15

    What, then, is meant by judicial self-restraint? Generally speaking, it means that whenever judicial review is undertaken on the basis of broad and imprecise constitutional provisions, such as human rights, for example, which often have this character of being broad legal principles, the courts should give significant leeway or margin to the assessment of the legislator, recognizing the direct democratic mandate of the latter. More precisely, judicial self-restraint means that, vis-à-vis the legislator, a court should not insist in every detail on its own final say as to the specific contents of broad constitutional norms. 16 A self-restrained court will sometimes, due to considerations of democratic legitimacy, accept the assessment of the legislator as constitutional, even if from the point of view of constitutional interpretation the court would have preferred a different solution itself. As such, judicial self-restraint is a matter of degree—the degree of restraint determines the depth or intensity of a court's judicial review. It is, in other words, a question of the clarity or certainty with which an act of Parliament must contravene the constitution before the courts will strike it down.

    In this respect, it is possible to identify, roughly, three different standards of review, depending on the degree of self-restraint, that is, the deference to the democratically elected legislator. The most cautious standard of review may be labeled the plausibility or rational basis test in this situation, the courts will only set aside legislation that is manifestly in violation of the constitution, since it contravenes any plausible interpretation of it. 17 A less cautious, yet still restrained, approach may be labeled the reasonableness test. In this version, the courts will set aside legislation that cannot reasonably be justified under the constitution however, if a reasonable justification is provided, the courts will not substitute their own views for those of the legislator. Finally, the unrestrained approach may be labeled the strict scrutiny or merits test in this case, a legislative proposal is set aside if it does not correspond, in every respect, to the court's own view of what the constitution requires in the specific case. Needless to say, the choice between these different standards of judicial review will often determine whether or not a piece of legislation is declared unconstitutional by the courts. 18

    In Denmark the tradition of self-restraint has been strong. The Danish Constitution from 1849 does not explicitly provide for the judicial review of legislation, as a result of strong disagreement among the founding fathers on the subject. Thus, as in the U.S., a right of judicial review was established in the case law of the Supreme Court. The tradition of self-restraint can be traced back to 1921 when the Danish Supreme Court first asserted the power of judicial review in Danish constitutional law. Upholding an act of parliament concerning landownership reform, 19 the Supreme Court stated that the citizen's claim that the act had not provided full compensation for his loss of property could not be affirmed “with the certainty which is required for the courts to set aside an act of Parliament as unconstitutional.” 20

    The standard of review defined here corresponds to the most cautious standard of review mentioned above, the plausibility or rational basis test. When the Danish Supreme Court applied such a strong version of judicial self-restraint, it recognized a constitutional need for the courts to defer to the assessment of the legislator, and thus the Supreme Court itself implicitly provided legal authority for the view that in a democracy the political organs must, within broad constitutional limits, prevail over those of the judiciary, which has no similar democratic mandate. 21 The very cautious standard of review defined by the Supreme Court in 1921 has, since then, been regarded as the general standard for judicial review in Danish constitutional law. 22

    No doubt, this strong tradition of self-restraint is an important reason why, until 1999, no act of parliament was ever set aside as unconstitutional by a Danish court. Quite revealing in this respect are the following remarks made in 1989 by a Danish Supreme Court judge in a legal article:

    As is known, the Danish Supreme Court has not, to this date, set aside an act of Parliament as unconstitutional, although it seems, at times, there was occasion to do so. The willingness of the courts to set aside acts of Parliament may be compared to an emergency brake: only if the machine runs wild, leaving the population and its general sense of justice behind, may one expect the use of the emergency brake. 23

    2.2. Legal positivism and legal realism

    There is little doubt that the absence, until 1999, of any instance of an act of Parliament being set aside by the courts can be attributed, in large measure, to this strong doctrine of judicial self-restraint. Another explanatory factor has been the strong hold of the positivist-realist tradition of legal interpretation on Danish law.

    The positivist tradition of interpretation is based on the need for objective sources of law and a corresponding predictability in legal adjudication. The legal text—as represented, for instance, by statutes and other legislative documents—is the binding framework of interpretation. Any deviation from the text based on considerations of the objective and spirit of the legal provision is regarded with suspicion as a political exercise from which judges ought to abstain as far as possible. Equally, to fill out gaps left open by the wording of the text, judges should refer to the travaux préparatoires, which convey information as to the intentions of the political majority that launched the legislation, rather than to the dynamics of societal developments. From a positivist perspective, everything going beyond such limits toward a more autonomous and dynamic style of interpretation is essentially tantamount to lawmaking and should only be undertaken by judges when absolutely necessary for the reasonable functioning of the legal system. 24 Clearly, such an approach implies severe restrictions on the interpretation of constitutional norms regarding human rights. Most human rights have the character of principles, which can only be adequately and effectively realized if the interpreter is willing, sometimes, to look behind the text's actual statement of the principle and, further, is willing to implement the principle in accordance with present-day conditions and norms. In a rigid positivist universe, many human rights provisions will be declared nonjusticiable political declarations.

    Legal realism adds a further restriction. In the Nordic countries, in general, Scandinavian realism flourished throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries and was represented by prominent legal thinkers such as Alf Ross, Karl Olivecrona, and Alex Hägerström. The realist perspective asks the legal interpreter to interpret legal norms in their political and societal context, to take reality into account. Realism, thus, will even allow for those rights that are justiciable to be restricted by political needs, that is, realism will accept a restrictive political practice as relevant to the legal interpretation of rights.

    This has largely been the tenor of the Danish legal tradition in the field of human rights. Legal interpretation would never go beyond the textual limits of rights provisions but occasionally would accept restrictions of the textual protection by reference to political practice. 25 Thus, the positivist-realist approach to legal—including constitutional—interpretation more or less takes away whatever potential might be left for judicial review under a strong doctrine of self-restraint. The link between self-restraint and a positivist approach to interpretation is quite clear, as may be seen in the following quotation, which for decades has been regarded as authoritative in explaining the standard of review applied by Danish courts. According to this statement, it was clearly established by the landmark Supreme Court judgment from 1921, mentioned above, that “… the courts may only set aside an act of Parliament as unconstitutional, if the act's incompatibility with the text of the Constitution is certain and manifest.” 26

    In sum, the traditional commitment of Danish courts to a strong version of the doctrine of self-restraint reflects both a commitment to the primacy of Parliament in the constitutional power structure, and a positivist-realist tradition of legal interpretation that empties most human rights norms of their normative potential. This has left the constitutional human rights protection against encroachment by the legislator almost nonexistent and has rendered nearly illusory the prospect of a Danish court setting aside an act of Parliament.

    2.3. The European impulse

    While there has been sporadic criticism of this tradition on purely constitutional grounds, 27 it was the challenge from European law that provided the decisive impulse for rethinking the Danish constitutional and legal tradition, most notably in the sphere of human rights. 28 Through the 1990s, legal scholars and judges increasingly voiced the need to reconsider the Danish constitutional and legal tradition in light of the case law from the European Court of Human Rights and the European Court of Justice, that is, to recognize a stronger constitutional role of courts 29 as well as a more autonomous and dynamic style of legal interpretation. 30 It was argued—at least, by some—that a more active constitutional role for Danish courts was not only necessary to implement European human rights obligations in national law but also had become more legitimate, seeing the way the Strasbourg and Luxembourg courts were applying, developing, and enforcing European law. The former president of the Danish Supreme Court Niels Pontoppidan was clearly one of the voices that spoke out in support of this development in the 1990s. He talked about the European legal development as “a wake-up call” for Danish political life in general and for Danish judges in particular. He pointed out that “… the development in Europe since the Second World War has implied that the strong positivistic emphasis on the lawmaker as the ultimate source of legitimation is no longer a sufficient description of the legal realities.” 31

    The 1990s were indeed interpreted by many as a turning point for constitutional law since, for the first time ever, we had a Danish court setting aside an Act of Parliament. In 1999, the Supreme Court struck down an act providing for the withdrawal of grants from seven individual free schools, holding the act to be in contravention of the provision on the separation of powers in article 3 of the Danish Constitution. 32 In the same period, the Supreme Court in 1996 agreed for the first time to review the compatibility of Danish participation in the EU with the Danish Constitution. 33 And then, in 1998, it handed down its elaborate judgment on the merits of the case, finding the Danish accession to the Maastricht Treaty to be compatible with constitutional requirements, while defining certain constitutional reservations regarding the future interaction between Danish and EU law. 34

    The fact that these landmark constitutional judgments were delivered during the same period when it was realized, at least by some central actors, that there was a need to strengthen the courts’ role in light of European developments may or may not have been mere coincidence. It remains, however, that the perceived need to reinvent Danish legal and constitutional tradition in the face of European legal developments was very real it even found expression in an official governmental report on the judiciary from 1996. This report mentions the constitutional role of Danish courts in connection with European developments. Referring to the impact of European legal developments, notably, the increasing influence of human rights and case law from the Strasbourg and Luxembourg courts, it states that:

    [T]his development contributes to a changed role of the courts—a role where the courts must exercise to a greater degree than before an autonomous lawmaking function. Thus, it is to be expected that the judges will have to apply a broader style of interpretation and a doctrine of the sources of law that goes beyond and, thereby, partly differs from the existing one. The development underlines the importance of the judiciary as an independent third branch of government. 35

    A statement such as this, envisaging a departure from the restrictive Danish tradition regarding the constitutional role of the courts, would seem promising for Danish law's ability to adapt to the challenge of the ECHR and the EU. If its import were fully absorbed, it would not only help for a more efficient implementation of European law but also would encourage national contributions to the development of ECHR and EU law.

    In the following sections we shall see to what extent such a development actually has taken place in connection with the ECHR and EU law, respectively.

    The Stacks project

    Let $L/K$ be a finite extension of fields. By Lemma 9.4.1 we can choose an isomorphism $L cong K^$ of $K$-modules. Of course $n = [L : K]$ is the degree of the field extension. Using this isomorphism we get for a $K$-algebra map

    Thus given $alpha in L$ we can take the trace and the determinant of the corresponding matrix. Of course these quantities are independent of the choice of the basis chosen above. More canonically, simply thinking of $L$ as a finite dimensional $K$-vector space we have $ ext_ K(alpha : L o L)$ and the determinant $det _ K(alpha : L o L)$.

    Definition 9.20.1 . Let $L/K$ be a finite extension of fields. For $alpha in L$ we define the trace $ ext_(alpha ) = ext_ K(alpha : L o L)$ and the norm $ ext_(alpha ) = det _ K(alpha : L o L)$.

    It is clear from the definition that $ ext_$ is $K$-linear and satisfies $ ext_(alpha ) = [L : K]alpha $ for $alpha in K$. Similarly $ ext_$ is multiplicative and $ ext_(alpha ) = alpha ^<[L : K]>$ for $alpha in K$. This is a special case of the more general construction discussed in Exercises, Exercises 109.22.6 and 109.22.7.

    Lemma 9.20.2 . Let $L/K$ be a finite extension of fields. Let $alpha in L$ and let $P$ be the minimal polynomial of $alpha $ over $K$. Then the characteristic polynomial of the $K$-linear map $alpha : L o L$ is equal to $P^ e$ with $e deg (P) = [L : K]$.

    Proof. Choose a basis $eta _1, ldots , eta _ e$ of $L$ over $K(alpha )$. Then $e$ satisfies $e deg (P) = [L : K]$ by Lemmas 9.9.2 and 9.7.7. Then we see that $L = igoplus K(alpha ) eta _ i$ is a direct sum decomposition into $alpha $-invariant subspaces hence the characteristic polynomial of $alpha : L o L$ is equal to the characteristic polynomial of $alpha : K(alpha ) o K(alpha )$ to the power $e$.

    To finish the proof we may assume that $L = K(alpha )$. In this case by Cayley-Hamilton we see that $alpha $ is a root of the characteristic polynomial. And since the characteristic polynomial has the same degree as the minimal polynomial, we find that equality holds. $square$

    Lemma 9.20.3 . Let $L/K$ be a finite extension of fields. Let $alpha in L$ and let $P = x^ d + a_1 x^ + ldots + a_ d$ be the minimal polynomial of $alpha $ over $K$. Then

    Proof. Follows immediately from Lemma 9.20.2 and the definitions. $square$

    Lemma 9.20.4 . Let $L/K$ be a finite extension of fields. Let $V$ be a finite dimensional vector space over $L$. Let $varphi : V o V$ be an $L$-linear map. Then

    Proof. Choose an isomorphism $V = L^$ so that $varphi $ corresponds to an $n imes n$ matrix. In the case of traces, both sides of the formula are additive in $varphi $. Hence we can assume that $varphi $ corresponds to the matrix with exactly one nonzero entry in the $(i, j)$ spot. In this case a direct computation shows both sides are equal.

    In the case of norms both sides are zero if $varphi $ has a nonzero kernel. Hence we may assume $varphi $ corresponds to an element of $ ext_ n(L)$. Both sides of the formula are multiplicative in $varphi $. Since every element of $ ext_ n(L)$ is a product of elementary matrices we may assume that $varphi $ either looks like

    (because we may also permute the basis elements if we like). In both cases the formula is easy to verify by direct computation. $square$

    Lemma 9.20.5 . Let $M/L/K$ be a tower of finite extensions of fields. Then

    Proof. Think of $M$ as a vector space over $L$ and apply Lemma 9.20.4. $square$

    The trace pairing is defined using the trace.

    Definition 9.20.6 . Let $L/K$ be a finite extension of fields. The trace pairing for $L/K$ is the symmetric $K$-bilinear form

    It turns out that a finite extension of fields is separable if and only if the trace pairing is nondegenerate.

    Lemma 9.20.7 . Let $L/K$ be a finite extension of fields. The following are equivalent:

    $ ext_$ is not identically zero, and

    the trace pairing $Q_$ is nondegenerate.

    Proof. It is clear that (3) implies (2). If (2) holds, then pick $gamma in L$ with $ ext_(gamma ) ot= 0$. Then if $alpha in L$ is nonzero, we see that $Q_(alpha , gamma /alpha ) ot= 0$. Hence $Q_$ is nondegenerate. This proves the equivalence of (2) and (3).

    Suppose that $K$ has characteristic $p$ and $L = K(alpha )$ with $alpha otin K$ and $alpha ^ p in K$. Then $ ext_(1) = p = 0$. For $i = 1, ldots , p - 1$ we see that $x^ p - alpha ^$ is the minimal polynomial for $alpha ^ i$ over $K$ and we find $ ext_(alpha ^ i) = 0$ by Lemma 9.20.3. Hence for this kind of purely inseparable degree $p$ extension we see that $ ext_$ is identically zero.

    Assume that $L/K$ is not separable. Then there exists a subfield $L/K'/K$ such that $L/K'$ is a purely inseparable degree $p$ extension as in the previous paragraph, see Lemmas 9.14.6 and 9.14.5. Hence by Lemma 9.20.5 we see that $ ext_$ is identically zero.

    Assume on the other hand that $L/K$ is separable. By induction on the degree we will show that $ ext_$ is not identically zero. Thus by Lemma 9.20.5 we may assume that $L/K$ is generated by a single element $alpha $ (use that if the trace is nonzero then it is surjective). We have to show that $ ext_(alpha ^ e)$ is nonzero for some $e geq 0$. Let $P = x^ d + a_1 x^ + ldots + a_ d$ be the minimal polynomial of $alpha $ over $K$. Then $P$ is also the characteristic polynomial of the linear maps $alpha : L o L$, see Lemma 9.20.2. Since $L/k$ is separable we see from Lemma 9.12.4 that $P$ has $d$ pairwise distinct roots $alpha _1, ldots , alpha _ d$ in an algebraic closure $overline$ of $K$. Thus these are the eigenvalues of $alpha : L o L$. By linear algebra, the trace of $alpha ^ e$ is equal to $alpha _1^ e + ldots + alpha _ d^ e$. Thus we conclude by Lemma 9.13.2. $square$

    Let $K$ be a field and let $Q : V imes V o K$ be a bilinear form on a finite dimensional vector space over $K$. Say $dim _ K(V) = n$. Then $Q$ defines a linear map $Q : V o V^*$, $v mapsto Q(v, -)$ where $V^* = mathop> olimits _ K(V, K)$ is the dual vector space. Hence a linear map

    If we pick a basis element $omega in wedge ^ n(V)$, then we can write $det (Q)(omega ) = lambda omega ^*$, where $omega ^*$ is the dual basis element in $wedge ^ n(V)^*$. If we change our choice of $omega $ into $c omega $ for some $c in K^*$, then $omega ^*$ changes into $c^ <-1>omega ^*$ and therefore $lambda $ changes into $c^2 lambda $. Thus the class of $lambda $ in $K/(K^*)^2$ is well defined and is called the discriminant of $Q$. Unwinding the definitions we see that

    if $ < v_1, ldots , v_ n>$ is a basis for $V$ over $K$. Observe that the discriminant is nonzero if and only if $Q$ is nondegenerate.

    Definition 9.20.8 . Let $L/K$ be a finite extension of fields. The discriminant of $L/K$ is the discriminant of the trace pairing $Q_$.

    By the discussion above and Lemma 9.20.7 we see that the discriminant is nonzero if and only if $L/K$ is separable. For $a in K$ we often say “the discriminant is $a$” when it would be more correct to say the discriminant is the class of $a$ in $K/(K^*)^2$.

    Exercise 9.20.9 . Let $L/K$ be an extension of degree $2$. Show that exactly one of the following happens

    the discriminant is $, the characteristic of $K$ is $2$, and $L/K$ is purely inseparable obtained by taking a square root of an element of $K$,

    the discriminant is $1$, the characteristic of $K$ is $2$, and $L/K$ is separable of degree $2$,

    the discriminant is not a square, the characteristic of $K$ is not $2$, and $L$ is obtained from $K$ by taking the square root of the discriminant.


    Behavior Edit

    A positivistic approach to behavior research, TRA attempts to predict and explain one's intention of performing a certain behavior. The theory requires that behavior be clearly defined in terms of the four following concepts: Action (e.g. to go, get), Target (e.g. a mammogram), Context (e.g. at the breast screening center), and Time (e.g. in the 12 months). [6] According to TRA, behavioral intention is the main motivator of behavior, while the two key determinants on behavioral intention are people's attitudes and norms. [7] By examining attitudes and subjective norms, researchers can gain an understanding as to whether or not one will perform the intended action. [7]

    Attitudes Edit

    According to TRA, attitudes are one of the key determinants of behavioral intention and refer to the way people feel towards a particular behavior. [8] These attitudes are influenced by two factors: the strength of behavioral beliefs regarding the outcomes of the performed behavior (i.e. whether or not the outcome is probable) and the evaluation of the potential outcomes (i.e. whether or not the outcome is positive). [7] Attitudes regarding a certain behavior can either be positive, negative or neutral. [9] The theory stipulates that there exists a direct correlation between attitudes and outcomes, such that if one believes that a certain behavior will lead to a desirable or favorable outcome, then one is more likely to have a positive attitude towards the behavior. Alternatively, if one believes that a certain behavior will lead to an undesirable or unfavorable outcome, then one is more likely to have a negative attitude towards the behavior. [7] [8]

    Behavioral belief Edit

    Behavioral belief allows us to understand people's motivations for their behavior in terms of the behavior's consequences. [10] This concept stipulates that people tend to associate the performance of a certain behavior with a certain set of outcomes or features. [8] For example, a person believes that if he or she studies for a month for his or her driver's license test, that one will pass the test after failing it the first time without studying at all. Here, the behavioral belief is that studying for a month is equated with success, whereas not studying at all is associated with failure.

    Evaluation Edit

    The evaluation of the outcome refers to the way people perceive and evaluate the potential outcomes of a performed behavior. [7] Such evaluations are conceived in a binary "good-bad" fashion-like manner. [6] For example, a person may evaluate the outcome of quitting smoking cigarettes as positive if the behavioral belief is improved breathing and clean lungs. Conversely, a person may evaluate the outcome of quitting smoking cigarettes as negative if the behavioral belief is weight gain after smoking cessation.

    Subjective norms Edit

    Subjective norms are also one of the key determinants of behavioral intention and refer to the way perceptions of relevant groups or individuals such as family members, friends, and peers may affect one's performance of the behavior. [9] Ajzen defines subjective norms as the "perceived social pressure to perform or not perform the behavior". [8] According to TRA, people develop certain beliefs or normative beliefs as to whether or not certain behaviors are acceptable. [7] These beliefs shape one's perception of the behavior and determine one's intention to perform or not perform the behavior. [7] [8] For example, if one believes that recreational drug use (the behavior) is acceptable within one's social group, one will more likely be willing to engage in the activity. Alternatively, if one's friends groups perceive that the behavior is bad, one will be less likely to engage in recreational drug use. However, subjective norms also take into account people's motivation to comply with their social circle's views and perceptions, which vary depending on the situation and the individual's motivations. [7]

    Normative beliefs Edit

    Normative beliefs touch on whether or not referent groups approve of the action. There exists a direct correlation between normative beliefs and performance of the behavior. Usually, the more likely the referent groups will approve of the action, the more likely the individual perform will the act. Conversely, the less likely the referent groups will approve of the action, the less likely the individual will perform the act. [6]

    Motivation to comply Edit

    Motivation to comply addresses the fact that individuals may or may not comply with social norms of the referent groups surrounding the act. Depending on the individual's motivations in terms of adhering to social pressures, the individual will either succumb to the social pressures of performing the act if it is deemed acceptable, or alternatively will resist to the social pressures of performing the act if it is deemed unacceptable. [6]

    Behavioral intention Edit

    Behavioral intention is a function of both attitudes and subjective norms toward that behavior (also known as the normative component). Attitudes being how strongly one holds the attitude toward the act and subjective norms being the social norms associated with the act. The stronger the attitude and the more positive the subjective norm, the higher the A-B relationship should be. However, the attitudes and subjective norms are unlikely to be weighted equally in predicting behavior. Depending on the individual and situation, these factors might have different impacts on behavioral intention, thus a weight is associated with each of these factors. [11] A few studies have shown that direct prior experience with a certain activity results in an increased weight on the attitude component of the behavioral intention function. [12]

    Formula Edit

    In its simplest form, the TRA can be expressed as the following equation:

    • BI = behavioral intention
    • (AB) = one's attitude toward performing the behavior
    • W = empirically derived weights
    • SN = one's subjective norm related to performing the behavior [13]

    Conditions Edit

    The TRA theorists note that there are three conditions that can affect the relationship between behavioral intention and behavior. The first condition is that "the measure of intention must correspond with respect to their levels of specificity". [14] This means that to predict a specific behavior, the behavioral intention must be equally specific. The second condition is that there must be "stability of intentions between time of measurement and performance of behavior". [14] The intention must remain the same between the time that it is given and the time that the behavior is performed. The third condition is "the degree to which carrying out the intention is under the volitional control of the individual". [14] The individual always has the control of whether or not to perform the behavior. These conditions have to do with the transition from verbal responses to actual behavior. [14]

    Scope Edit

    While Fishbein and Ajzen developed the TRA within the field of health to understand health behaviors, the theorists asserted that TRA could be applied in any given context to understand and even predict any human behavior. [7] According to Sheppard et al., behavioral intention can predict the performance of "any voluntary act, unless intent changes prior to the performance or unless the intention measure does not correspond to the behavioral criterion in terms of action, target, context, time-frame and/or specificity". [15] Their statement asserts that according to TRA, the measure of behavioral intention can predict whether or not an individual will perform a certain act, as long as the behavioral intention remains the same and the behavior is clearly and properly defined. [15] [9] Broadening the scope of TRA, Sheppard conducted a study in which they applied TRA in situations that did not completely comply or conform with Fishbein and Ajzen's framework. Surveying 87 previous empirical studies, they applied the theory in contexts where the individual did not have full volitional control over the behavior and/or where individuals did not have all the information to develop the intention. [16] To their surprise, they found that TRA could successfully be applied in situations that did not fully adhere to the three formal terms and conditions specified by the theory. [15] [16]

    Limitations Edit

    Although the scope of TRA is wide, the theory still has its limitations and like any other theory, needs constant refinement and revision particularly when extending to choice and goals. [15] The distinction between a goal intention and a behavioral intention concerns the capability to achieve one's intention, which involves multiple variables thus creating great uncertainty. Ajzen acknowledged that "some behaviors are more likely to present problems of controls than others, but we can never be absolutely certain that we will be in a position to carry out our intentions. Viewed in this light it becomes clear that strictly speaking every intention is a goal whose attainment is subject to some degree of uncertainty." [17] [18]

    According to Eagly and Chaiken, TRA does not take into account that certain conditions that enable the performance of a behavior are not available to individuals. [19] Since the TRA focuses on behaviors that people decisively enact, the theory is limited in terms of being able to predict behaviors that require access to certain opportunities, skills, conditions, and/or resources. [19] [16] Additionally, certain intentions do not necessarily play a role in terms of connecting attitudes and behavior. [20] According to a study conducted by Bagozzi and Yi, the performance of a behavior is not always preceded by a strong intent. In fact, attitudes and behaviors may not always be linked by intentions, particularly when the behavior does not require much cognitive effort. [20] [16]

    In 1979, H. C. Triandis proposed expanding TRA to include more components. These factors were habit, facilitating conditions, and affect. When a person performs a behavior in a routine manner they form a habit. Facilitating conditions are conditions that make completion of an action more or less difficult. Both of these conditions affect their behavior directly. On the other hand, affect is the emotional response a person has towards a behavior and this emotional response only affects behavioral intention rather than directly affecting behavior. [21] This expanded version of TRA has been used to study behaviors like women's participation in mammography procedures. [22]

    In 1985, Ajzen extended TRA to what he refers as the theory of planned behavior (TPB). This involves the addition of one major predictor—perceived behavioral control. [23] This addition was introduced to account for times when people have the intention to conduct the behavior, but the actual behavior is thwarted because of subjective and objective reasons. [18] In the theory of planned behavior, the attitude, subjective norms, and behavioral control have "important although differently weighted effects on a person's intention to behave". [11]

    In spite of the improvement, it is suggested that TRA and TPB only provides an account of the determinants of behavior when both motivation and opportunity to process information are high. Further research demonstrating the causal relationships among the variables in TPB and any expansions of it is clearly necessary. [24] The model also mentions little about the memory process. [25]

    TRA has been used in many studies as a framework for examining specific kinds of behavior such as communication behavior, consumer behavior and health behavior. Many researchers use the theory to study behaviors that are associated with high risks and danger like unethical conduct, [26] as well as deviant behavior. In contrast, some research has applied the theory to more normative and rational types of action like voting behavior. [27] Researchers Davies, Foxall, and Pallister suggest that TRA can be tested if "behavior is measured objectively without drawing a connection to prior intention". [28] Most studies, however, look at intention because of its central role in the theory.

    Communication Edit

    College fraternity and sorority hazing Edit

    TRA has been applied to the study of whistle-blowing intentions and hazing in college organizations, specifically fraternities and sororities. Richardson et al. set out to study whistle-blowing by using TRA as a framework to predict whether or not individuals will come forward about report hazing incidents. Their study served to examine whether the relationships suggested by the TRA model remain true in predicting whistle blowing intentions, and if these relationships would change depending on the severity of the hazing incident.

    Richardson et al. surveyed a sample of 259 students from Greek organizations at university in the Southwestern United States. The survey questions measured the different aspects of the TRA model: behavioral beliefs, outcome evaluations, attitude toward the behavior, normative beliefs, motivation to comply, subjective norms, and the consequence endogenous variable. The questions asked respondents to rate their responses on various 7 point scales. "Participants in the study responded to one of three scenarios, varying in level of severity, describing a hazing situation occurring in their fraternity or sorority". [29] In line with the theory, the researchers wanted to identify if attitudes held about hazing, dangerous activity, and group affiliation, along with subjective norms about whistle-blowing (reactions by others, consequences of reporting the action, isolation from the group) would influence whether or not an individual would go through with reporting a hazing incident. The results of the study found that individuals were more likely to report, or whistle-blow, on hazing incidents that were more severe or harmful to individuals. Simultaneously, individuals were also concerned about the perceptions of others' attitudes towards them and the consequences they may face if they reported hazing incidents.

    Public relations and marketing Edit

    TRA can be applied to the field of public relations and marketing by applying the basics of the theory to campaigns. A few examples of this is using it in a hotel marketing strategy and how likely customers are to come back to the hotel based on behaviors. [30] Brands and companies can use this theory to see what consumers are going to buy and how to create materials for campaigns based on this information. [31] Other researchers investigated the consumers’ motivation and extended TRA model. [32]

    Knowledge sharing in companies Edit

    TRA is used to examine the communication behavior in corporations. One of the behaviors TRA helped characterize is knowledge sharing (KS) in companies. In the study conducted by Ho, Hsu, and Oh, they proposed two models to construct KS process by introducing TRA and game theory (GT). One model captures personal psychological feelings (attitudes and subjective norms), the other model not only captures personal feelings but also takes other people's decisions into consideration. By comparing the two models, researchers found that the model based on TRA has a higher predictive accuracy than the model based on TRA and GT. They concluded that employees "have a high probability of not analyzing the decisions of others", [33] and whether taking other colleague's decision into account has a great impact on people's KS behavioral intention. It is indicated that "the more indirect decision-makers there are in organizations, the less effective is KS". [33] To encourage KS, company managers should avoid including indirect decision-makers in the projects. [33]

    Consumer behavior Edit

    Coupon usage Edit

    Coupon usage has also been studied through TRA framework by researchers interested in consumer and marketer behavior. In 1984, Terence Shimp and Alican Kavas applied this theory to coupon usage behavior, with the research premise that "coupon usage is rational, systematic, and thoughtful behavior" [34] in contrast with other applications of the theory to more dangerous types of behavior.

    TRA serves as a useful model because it can help examine whether "consumers' intentions to use coupons are determined by their attitudes and perceptions of whether important others think one should or should not expend the effort to clip, save, and use coupons". [34] The consumer's behavior intentions are influenced by their personal beliefs about coupon usage, meaning whether or not they think saving money is important and are willing to spend the time clipping coupons. These potential beliefs also influenced the coupon user's thoughts about what others think about their usage of coupons. Together, the coupon user will use their own beliefs and the opinions of others to form an overall attitude towards coupon usage. To approach this study, Shimp and Alican surveyed 770 households and measured the aspects of the TRA model in terms of the participant's responses. The received responses indicated that consumers' norms are "partially determined by their personal beliefs toward coupon usage, and to an even greater extend, that attitudes are influenced by internalizations of others' beliefs". [34] Positive attitudes towards this behavior are influenced by an individual's perceptions that their partners will be satisfied by their time spent and efforts made to save money.

    Brand loyalty Edit

    TRA has been applied to redefine brand loyalty. According to TRA, the antecedents of purchase behavior are attitudes towards the purchase and subjective norm. In 1998, Ha conducted a study to investigate the relationships among several antecedents of unit brand loyalty (UBL) by introducing TRA. Consumers are brand loyal when both attitude and behavior are favorable. In his study, Ha developed a table indicating 8 combinations of customers' brand loyalty based on their loyalty on 3 variables – attitude towards the behavior, subjective norm, and purchase behavior is loyal. According to Ha, marketing managers should not be discouraged by a temporary disloyalty and need to strive for grabbing brand loyalty when customers are showing loyalty to two of the three variables, but they need to rediagnose their customers' brand loyalty when customers are showing loyalty to only one of them. The main focus should be pointed at either enhancing the consumer's attitude toward their brand or adjusting their brand to the social norms. [35] New research investigated norms in social media, contributing to TRA from a more updating perspective. [36]

    Green Behaviors Edit

    TRA has also been used to study consumer attitudes towards renewable energy. In 2000, Bang, et. al found that people who cared about environmental issues like pollution were more willing to spend more for renewable energy. [37] Similarly, a 2008 study of Swedish consumers by Hansla et. al showed that those who with a positive view of renewable energy were more willing to spend money on sustainable energy for their homes. [38] These studies are evidence that the emotional response people have towards a topic affects their attitude, which in turn affects their behavioral intent. These studies also provide examples for how the TRA is used to market goods that might not make the most sense from a strictly economic perspective. Gotch and Hall examined children’s nature-related behaviors through TRA approach. [39]

    In addition, Mishara et al.'s research proved there is a positively relation between behavioral intention and actual behavior in green information technology (GIT) acceptance. Those professionals with positive intentions towards GIT tend to exploit GIT into practice. [40]

    Health behavior Edit

    Condom use Edit

    TRA has been frequently used as a framework and predictive mechanism of applied research on sexual behavior, especially in prevention of sexually transmitted disease such as HIV. In 2001, Albarracín, Johnson, Fishbein, and Muellerleile applied theory of reasoned action (TRA) and theory of planned behavior (TPB) into studying how well the theories predict condom use. [41] To be consistent with TRA, the authors synthesized 96 data sets (N = 22,594), and associate every component in condom use with certain weight. Their study indicates that TRA and TPB are highly successful predictors of condom use. According to their discussion, "people are more likely to use condoms if they have previously formed the corresponding intentions. These intentions to use condoms appear to derive from attitudes, subjective norms, and perceived behavioral control. These attitudes and norms, in turn, appear to derive from outcome and normative beliefs. Nevertheless, whether behavior was assessed retrospectively or prospectively was an important moderator that influenced the magnitude of the associations between theoretically important variables." [41]

    Sexual behavior in teenage girls Edit

    In 2011, W.M. Doswell, Braxter, Cha, and Kim examined sexual behavior in African American teenage girls and applied the theory as a framework for understanding this behavior. TRA can explain these behaviors in that teens' behavioral intentions to engage in early sexual behavior are influenced by their pre-existing attitudes and subjective norms of their peers. Attitudes in this context are favorable or unfavorable dispositions towards teenage sexual behavior. [2] Subjective norms are the perceived social pressure teenagers feel from their friends, classmates, and other peer groups to engage in sexual behavior. As a framework, the TRA suggests that adolescents will participate in early behavior because of their own attitudes towards the behavior and the subjective norms of their peers. In this case, intention is the willful plan to perform early sexual behavior. [2] Findings from the student showed that the TRA was supportive in predicting early sexual behavior among African American teenage girls. Attitudes towards sex and subjective norms both correlated with intentions to participate in early sexual behavior in the study's sample.

    Pediatricians, parents and HPV vaccinations Edit

    A 2011 study examining pediatricians' behaviors surrounding the human papillomavirus (HPV) vaccine found that TRA predicted the pediatricians would encourage parents to get their daughters vaccinated. Roberto, Krieger, Katz, Goei, and Jain discovered that the norms surrounding this topic were more important in predicting behavior than perceived behavioral control. [42]

    Exercise Edit

    The public health community, interested in reducing rising obesity rates, has used TRA to study people's exercise behavior. A 1981 study by Bentler and Speckart revealed that intent to exercise was determined by a person's attitude toward exercise, as predicted by TRA. [43] In a broader literature review on the study of exercise using TRA and TPB, it was determined that behavioral intent to exercise is better framed by TRA than TPB because perceived behavioral control did not have a significant effect on the intent to exercise. [44]

    Challenges Edit

    According to Fishbein's and Ajzen's original (1967) formulation of TRA, a behavioral intention measure will predict the performance of any voluntary act, unless intent changes prior to performance or unless the intention measure does not correspond to the behavioral criterion in terms of action, target, context, time-frame and/or specificity. [17] The model of TRA has been challenged by studies determined to examine its limitation and inadequacy.

    The major problem of TRA is pointed out to be the ignorance of the connections between individuals, both the interpersonal and social relations in which they act, and the broader social structures which govern social practice. [45] Although TRA recognizes the importance of social norms, strategies are limited to a consideration of individual perceptions of these social phenomena. An individual's belief, attitudes and understandings are constituted activity therefore the distinction of the two factors is ambiguous. In 1972, Schwartz and Tessler noted that there are other major and subjective determinants of intentions at play that go beyond attitudes toward the behavior and subjective norms. Namely, they propose that one's sense of right and wrongs, as well as one's beliefs surrounding moral obligation may also impact one's intention. [46] This value system is internalized independently from Fishbein and Ajzen's subjective norms. [16] Furthermore, social change may be generational rather than the sum of individual change. TRA fails to capture and oversimplifies the social processes of change and the social nature of the change itself: a model in which people collectively appropriate and construct new meanings and practice. [45] [16]

    Additionally, the habituation of past behavior also tends to reduce the impact that intention has on behavior as the habit increases. Gradually, the performance of the behavior become less of a rational, initiative behavior and more of a learned response. In addition, intention appears to have a direct effect on behavior in the short term only. [47] Besides, the analysis of the conceptual basis also raises concerns. It is criticized that the model does not enable the generation of hypothesis because of their ambiguity. The model focuses on analytic truth rather than synthetic one, therefore the conclusions resulting from those applications are often true by definition rather than by observation which makes the model unfalsifiable. [48] The strengths of attitudes toward a behavior (social/personal) and subjective norms also vary cross-culturally while the process by which the behavior engaged remains the same. An example of this is shown in a cross-cultural study on fast food choices, where people from Western cultures were found to be more influenced by their prior choice of restaurant than people from Eastern cultures. [49] This would suggest that people from different cultures weight subjective norms and existing attitudes differently. A closer examination of the cross-cultural communication process will benefit and complete the understanding of TRA. [50]

    Future directions Edit

    According to Jaccard James, three directions are waiting for further research in TRA. The first one is per-individual level. The second area is a split-second situations, namely, instant decision-making. The third one is multioption contexts. In other words, how people perform when facing multiple alternatives should be stressed in the future study. [51]

    Why is this important?

    You can use the following instruction to help participants reflect on their own cases. These handouts are also included in the instructions for trainees.

    Form for case reflection

    Think about one situation which you have encountered in your professional life in which you found yourself doubting about what was the right thing to do in order to act with integrity.

    It could be a situation in which you had to face a dilemma and found yourself wondering should I do A or B? Both options might have had undesirable consequences but nevertheless, you had to act and decide what to do.

    The purpose of this exercise is to invite you to reflect on your personal experience as researcher. Please note that not all the cases will be discussed during the exercise. The facilitator will contact you if your case has been selected for discussion during the exercise.

    All the cases will be destroyed after the training. Also, if you want you can contact your trainer and ask him to distribute and sign a confidentiality statement.

    You might consider printing and distributing a hand-out with a list of RI virtues and the pre-filled table to be used to support participants in step 5 of the exercise.

    Examples of virtues 2 :

    Resoluteness Accountability Availability Competency Patience Perseverance Reliability Sincerity Creativity Honesty Objectivity Humility Accountability, Punctuality, Trustworthiness/truthfulness, Selflessness Reflexivity Clarity of purpose Collaborative spirit Fairness Loyalty Moderation Positivity Respectfulness.

    Pre-filled example table:

    Name Virtue Norm/action
    Louise Honesty I should credit all the contributors
    Courage I should talk to my supervisor
    Ben Reliability I should do exactly what I promised to my colleague.


    One week before the exercise takes place ask participants to:

    1) Submit a RI personal case (by using the form for case reflection, see practical tips)

    2) Read the following theme pages on The Embassy:

    The submitted case does not need to be a research misconduct case but a case in which, as researchers, participants were in doubt about what was the right thing to do.

    While asking for cases it is good to manage expectations. Make sure to mention that not all the cases can be discussed during the exercise. However, reflecting on a personal case is important since it brings the focus on participants’ practice as researchers and underlines the fact that moral uncertainty is not something to be ashamed of but it is part of everyone’s experience.

    Select a case which might be interesting for participants and ask the case presenter if they would be willing to present the case during the session. Make sure it is a real and personal case and the case owner is able to tell the details of the case. Together you prepare a short description of the case to be distributed to the other participants (this is not mandatory). To help participants reflect on the case you can use a case reflection form (see practical tips).


    Start the session by welcoming participants and by giving a short introduction to the exercise. Explain the aim of the exercise properly. Please keep in mind that this exercise is not about personal opinions/judgements on what each participant would do in the case, or to justify or condemn what the case-owner did (or did not). Participants should be willing to engage in a dialogue and learn from each other. This should be stressed at the beginning of the session. Also, as a facilitator you should take into account that being a case presenter can be challenging and emotionally burdensome. It is your responsibility to protect the case presenter and call for a time-out in case the conversation becomes too heavy or uncomfortable.


    At this stage it is important to stress confidentiality. During the session a real-life dilemma will be explored, therefore participants are required to keep the information shared during the session strictly confidential. You are strongly recommended to distribute and sign a confidentiality statement in order to formalize the fact that the information you receive, and the ones that will be shred during the exercise should be kept confidential by all participants and by you and will be destroyed after the training.

    Orientation: case and dilemma

    Invite the case presenter to describe the case (previously selected) by focusing on why the case is experienced as morally troublesome. You and the group can help the case presenter to formulate the (two sides of) the dilemma (i.e. should I do A or B?). Yet, the case presenter determines what is the right formulation of their dilemma. In this phase try to focus on two alternative courses of action and avoid exploring third options or creative solutions. This helps to bring focus to the dialogue and encourages people not to start looking for a quick solutions or a way out of the dilemmas. Write down the dilemma and key words describing the case on a flip-chart.

    Replacing and clarification

    In this step you invite participants to put themselves in the case presenter’s shoes and think about which facts in the case need more clarification to gain a better understanding of the situation. All the relevant questions, which enable participants to put themselves in the shoes of the case presenter, should be asked at this point.

    Explaining how to fill in the tables about virtues and norms

    Once the case is clear you ask participants to put themselves in the case presenter’s shoes and think about which virtue(s) (two are enough but more are also welcome) would play a role in the specific dilemma, if they were in the case presenter’s situation. You can ask them:

    “If you were in the case presenter’s situation and had to decide what to do, which virtue would be important for you in order to make this decision?”

    Please note that virtues should not necessarily be linked to one of the options. In this step participants should reflect on which moral character (virtue) they should embody in order to act with integrity in the situation at stake. Contextually, you ask them to reflect about which rule of action (norm) or behaviour follows from the virtue they selected themselves. They can ask themselves

    “What should I do in this situation in order to act in accordance with this virtue?” “What rule of action should I follow in order to embody this virtue in this situation?”

    Please note that different norms can be related to the same virtue and vice versa.

    Refreshing concepts of virtue and norm

    Before moving forward provide participants with a short definition of virtues and norms (please see Values and norms and Virtues in research integrity) If people have question or doubts you can address them at this stage.

    Filling in the virtues and norms table

    Ask participants to fill in a table with the same elements (see below), for example:

    Virtue Norm/action
    Justice I should credit all contributors
    Courage I should speak up

    A hand-out with a list of Research Integrity related virtues, a table examples and an empty table can be distributed (see practical tips). Together with the empty table you distribute some post-its.

    In the meantime, draw the same table on a flip-chart (or white board) with three columns: perspective, virtue, norm (see below). You can also consider doing this in advance, before the session.

    Name Virtue Norm/action
    Louise Justice I should credit all the contributors
    Courage I should speak up
    Ben …..

    Ask all the participants to write their virtues and norms on a post-it (in clear and readable letters) and then invite them to stand up and go to the table you drew on the flip-chart to write down their own name and place their post-its with their virtue(s) and norms next to their name. In this way an overview of perspectives, virtues and norms is created.

    Dialogue by means of differences and similarities (15 min)

    Invite participants to look at the overview and asks the following questions in order to foster reflection:

    o What do you perceive as remarkable?

    o Are there similarities/differences between different perspectives? Are they in conflict with each other?

    o Are these virtues also mentioned or implied in the ECoC? If yes which ones?

    o Are we able to select a virtue which is supposed to be the most important in this situation? If so, why is this selected virtue the most important?

    o Putting yourselves in the case presenter’s shoes: what do you need (concretely) to act upon the virtue which the group selected? Are there any constraints?

    Report people’s answers on the board. You can use different colours, underline words and take short notes.

    If you are using this exercise for the first time please use the above questions to facilitate a dialogical reflection. Don’t forget to mention the ECoC. You could even consider bringing a copy of the code with you. Do not take too long for each question. If people start debating or if they go off topic direct them back towards the question at stake.

    If people cannot agree on one virtue that is also fine. Report the different conclusions on the table.

    Don't be afraid of silence. Let people think about the answer. Give them time but not too much, if there are no inputs move on.


    Invite participants to think about the entire process: what is the take home message of this session for them? Try to draw conclusions by asking participants:

    o Was it easy or difficult to relate the virtues and norms to each other? How/why so?

    o Did putting yourself in the case presenter’s shoes broaden the way you looked at virtues and, consequently norms and behaviors?

    o Did the virtues and norms/behaviors identified by others help you to look at virtues differently or more broadly? Do you think that will influence your thinking on ERI dilemmas in practice?

    Watch the video: 15 Κατασκευή κανονικού εξαγώνου (October 2021).